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1. In a computer context, the term access means an individual's ability to get at the
resources of a computer, including physical devices and data. Accessing data may involve
reading, modifying, or erasing data items. Unauthorized access is access through which an
unauthorized individual reads, modifies, or erases data for an impermissible purpose. See
Note, Hacking-The Unauthorised Access o/Computer Systems; The Legal Implications, 52
MOD. L. REv. 236, 237 (1989) [hereinafter Note, Hacking-The Unauthorised Access]
("Computer hacking is the accessing of computer-stored information without the permis
sion of the owner of the computer system or the information.").
When computers were first invented, the term hacker was an appellation of honor, not
a derogation. Programmers in academic research labs with access to early computers (in
the late 1950s and the 1960s) took pride in improving the function and performance of the
machines. Their philosophy embraced sharing and decentralization of computer knowl
edge, openness of discussion, and esteem for "innovation, style, and technical virtuosity."
See S. LEVY, HACKERS: HEROES OF THE CoMPUTER REVOLUTION 10 (1984). The
skilled programmers, known as hackers, had an irresistible urge to understand the work
ings of others' programs and to use that understanding to improve those programs to the
benefit of all machine users. To facilitate program improvement, hackers made all pro
grams accessible to all users, who then "could go through the programs of the master
hackers, looking for ideas, admiring the code. The idea was that computer programs be
longed not to individuals, but to the world of users." /d. at 115. This ethos facilitated
program improvements that were a great impetus to the development of better computer
systems, but it was no match for the sense of property rights held by increasing numbers of
users who valued the result of the computer's work and wanted to keep it and the programs
that were generated private. Over time, hacker came to mean any individual who, mostly
for the challenge of it, sought to access computer systems whether or not they were author
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systems, many people were tolerant of the perpetrators' ingenuity be
cause the results of the unauthorized access were benign. 2 Public reac
tion changed, however, when unauthorized access led to lost or
scrambled files 3 and necessitated system downtime in order to cleanse
ized to do so. See Note, Computer Crime and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986,
10 CoMPUTER/L.J. 71, 73 n.ll (1990) [hereinafter Note, Abuse Act].
2. See Reid, Reflections on Some Recent Widespread Computer Break-Ins, 30 COMM.
OF THE ACM 103, 103-05 (1987).
Other reasons for ambivalence include: the necessity for special expertise in order to
understand the technology of the crime; preparation of a case against a suspect can be time
consuming and tedious; the "criminals" seem more clever than dangerous; and finally,
large banks and businesses, rather than individuals, are the usual victims. Note, Computer
Viruses and the Law, 93 DICK. L. REV. 625, 630 (1989) [hereinafter Note, Computer Vi
ruses] (citing Gemignani, What is Computer Crime. and Why Should We Care?, 10 U.
ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 55, 56 (1987-88»; see Volgyes, The Investigation. Prosecution. and
Prevention of Computer Crime: A State-ofthe-Art Review, 2 COMPUTER/L.J. 385, 394-402
(1980) (discussing federal statutes regarding computer crime); Note, Computer Crime Stat
utes: Are They Bridging the Gap Between Law and Technology, II CRIM. JUST. J. 203, 206
(1988) [hereinafter Note, Bridging the Gap] (Most computer crimes are hard to detect;
consequently, they go undetected and unpunished.).
Sometimes, these "criminals" are not prosecuted because no harm is done or the in
truder is not detected. The fervor with which one prosecutes depends' upon what the
hacker does upon entry into the system.
Once the hacker has penetrated the computer system he may do one of sev
eral things. He may just read or copy the information, which may be highly
confidential; he may erase or change some or all of the information or he may
simply add something, such as a message boasting of his feat. The legal implica
tions depend upon which of these acts it is that the hacker performs. . . . The
worrying point of this is that, although people such as these intend no harm, they
demonstrate the weak security aspects of computer systems. If they can get in,
then so can others who will have less agreeable motives.
Note, Hacking-The Unauthorised Access, supra note I, at 237; see also Note, Bridging the
Gap, supra, at 203 (" 'Most non-violent crimes and even violent crimes such as homicide
can be committed through or facilitated by computers.''' (quoting S. NYCUM & D.
PARKER, PROSECUTORIAL EXPERIENCE WITH STATE COMPUTER CRIME LAWS 34
(1986»).
3. These lost or scrambled files are sometimes the result of computer viruses.
Computer viruses are computer instructions or small hidden programs that
are inserted into a standard computer program or into a computer's operating
system. These instructions may replicate many times during a single program
execution, infect every program on a computer disk and be passed on secretly to
other computers through modems, floppy discs, or network connections.
A programmer creates a virus by writing a computer code which can attach
itself to other programs. Once attached, this code may alter the operations of a
program or destroy data kept on a computer disk. A virus can "infect" a com
puter system as a result of programming or by users running an already infected
computer program on the system. Unsuspecting users running virus-infected pro
grams allow the virus to establish itself in a computer system. Once established,
the virus can access and modify any file the user is authorized to access. Similar
to a biological virus, a computer virus spreads rapidly from a single point of infec
tion. MUltiplying in geometrical progression as it works its way through a com

1990]

COMPUTER SERVICES PROVIDERS' LIABILITY

169

or reconstruct the systems. 4 When unauthorized access resulted in
damage, S people began to look at computer systems as entities worthy
puter system or network, the computer virus may contaminate all files within a
computer system.
A computer virus basically carries a genetic code in machine language. The
virus may be benign or malicious. A malicious virus can cripple a network with
dead-end tasks, erase files, create false information, and in some cases, destroy
equipment.
Note, Computer Viruses, supra note 2, at 627 (footnotes omitted).
Other forms of a computer crippling code are logic bombs, time bombs and worms. A
logic bomb is program code embedded in other code that, when triggered, is intended to
exhibit destructive behavior. A time bomb is code that unleashes its destructive behavior at
a preprogrammed time and date. A worm is code that replicates itself across computer
systems. Id. at 628. For additional information on logic bombs and worms, see
Gemignani, supra note 2, at 64 nn.38 & 39.
A more technical definition of a virus is as follows:
[A] virus program is a program that has the following attributes: (1) It must be
capable of modifying software not belonging to the virus by attaching its program
structure to the other program. (2) It must be capable of executing this modifica
tion on a number of programs. (3) It must have the capability of recognizing the
modification on other programs. (4) It must have the ability to prevent further
modification of the same program upon recognition of a previous modification.
(5) Modified software produced by the virus must have attributes (1) through (4).
A program lacking anyone of these characteristics is not technically considered a
virus.
Note, Computer Viruses: Is There a Legal "Antibiotic?", 16 RUTGERS CoMPUTER & TECH.
L.J. 253, 255 n.12 (1990) [hereinafter Note, Legal Antibiotic]; see BloomBecker, Computer
Crime Update: The View as We Exit /984, 7 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 627 (1985).
4. See generally Mace, Virus Outbreaks Spur Congress to Combat Threat, IN
FOWORLD, May 22, 1989, at 34, col. 5. The damages due to intruders have prompted the
proposal of federal legislation to create "criminal penalties for knowingly inserting viruses
that could cause loss, expense, or risk to health or welfare." Id. See generally Gemignani,
supra note 2, at 55; Tunick, Computer Law: An Overview, 13 LoY. L.A.L. REv. 315, 326
(1980) ("Experts believe that computer crime is almost impossible to detect and that it
costs the public at least $10 billion annually."); Note, Who is Calling Your Computer Next?
Hacker!, 8 CRIM. JUST. J. 89, 89 (1985) [hereinafter Note, Hacker!]; Note, Legal Antibi
otic, supra note 3, at 253 ("Between January and September of 1988 an estimated 250,000
U.S. computer users were affected by programs that could have potentially destroyed all
valuable data within their computer systems.").
5. Note, Bridging the Gap, supra note 2, at 206 ("Computer crime yields extraordina
rily higher profits per incident than traditional fraud and theft. Estimates of the average
proceeds have ranged from $10,517 to $450,000." (footnotes omitted».
There are five categories of common computer crime: financial crimes, property
crimes, information crimes, theft of services, and vandalism. In addition, there are five
phases of computer operation during which a criminal can intervene in the process: input,
programming, processing in the central processing unit, output and communication of
data. Tunick, supra note 4, at 326, 328. But see Note, Computer Abuse: The Emerging
Crime and the Need/or Legislation, 12 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 73, 74-75 (1984) [hereinafter
Note, Computer Abuse] ("Computer crime falls into four categories: (1) theft of money,
financial instruments, property, services, or valuable data; (2) unauthorized access to com
puter time; (3) illegal use of computer programs; and (4) unauthorized acquisition of stored
data." (footnotes omitted».
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of legal protection. As a result, state6 and federaF computer crime8
statutes have been enacted in the last five years,9 and additional bills
6. See. e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 502 (West 1990); CONN. GEN. STAT. § ~3a-251
(1989); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 815.01-07 (West Supp. 1990); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-14-602
(Supp. 1990); TEXAS PENAL CODE ANN. § 33.02 (Vernon Supp. 1991); WIS. STAT. ANN.
'. § 943.70 (1990).
For articles discussing state computer crime statutes, see BloomBecker, supra note 3,
at 627; Branscomb, Rogue Computer Programs and Computer Rogues: Tailoring the Pun
ishment to Fit the Crime, 16 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 1, 30-37 (1990);
Gemignani, Computer Crime: The Law in '80, 13 IND. L. REV. 681, 710-15 (1980); Leder
. man, Criminal Liability for Breach 0/ Confidential Commercial In/ormation, 38 EMORY
L.J. 921 (1989); Comment, Computer Crime Deterrence, 13 AM. J. CRIM. L. 391, 399-404
(1986); Note, Bridging the Gap, supra note 2, at 209-213,220-23; Note, Hacker!, supra note
~, at 102-07; Note, Abuse Act, supra note 1, at 75-76; Note, Computer Viruses, supra note 2,
at 641 (containing a list of relevant state statutes for forty-eight states); Note, Computer
Abuse, supra note 5, at 89-94; Note, An Overview 0/ Recent Changes in California Computer
Crime Laws: The Criminalization 0/ Computer Contamination and Strengthened Penalty
Provisions, 6 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 135-42 (1990) (discussing sig
nificant changes in and additions to current California law dealing with computer crime
!lnd 'new antiviral legislation); see also Branscomb, supra at 37-44 (discussing state legisla
tionpendlng in the Spring of 1989). See generally Nycum, The Criminal Law Aspects 0/
Computer Abuse: Part I: State Penal Laws, 5 RUTGERS J. COMPUTERS & L. 271, 276-95
(1976).
.
For examples of cases litigated under the California statute, see People v. Lowery, 200
Cal~ App. 3d 1207,246 Cal. Rptr. 443 (1988); Mahru v. Superior Court, 191 Cal. App. 3d
545, i37 Cal. Rptr. 298 (1987); People v. Gopal, 171 Cal. App. 3d 524, 217 Cal. Rptr. 487
(1985).
7.. See. e.g., Computer Security Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-235, 101 Stat. 1725;
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848; The
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-474, 100 Stat. 1213. For law
review articles discussing various federal computer crime statutes, see Branscomb, supra
note 6, at 44-48; Lederman, supra note 6, at 931-32, 978-93; Comment, supra note 6, at
392-99; Note, Bridging the Gap, supra note 2, at 213-15, 217-20; Note, Hacker!, supra note
4, at 99-102; Note, Abuse Act, supra note 1, at 76-84; Note, Computer Viruses, supra note 2,
at 636-38; Note, Computer Abuse, supra note 5, at 77-84; Note, The Electronic Communica
tions Privacy Act 0/ 1986: The Impact on'So/tware Communications Technologies, 2
SofTWARE L.J. 243 (1988).
8. The delay in bringing about legislation may be due to the lack of agreement as to a
. definition of "computer crime." The following are samples of the various definitions em
ployed. A. BEQUAI, COMPUTER CRIME 4 (1978) (A computer crime is "the use ofa com
puter to perpetuate acts' of deceit, concealment and guile that have as their objective the
obtaining of property, money, services, and political and business advantages."); Taber, A
Survey 0/ Computer Crime Studies, 2 COMPUTER/L.J. 275, 298 (1980) (A genuine com
puter crime is "8 crime that, in fact, occurred and in which a computer was directly and
significantly instrumental. ").
. 9. Although computers have been used widely by society for a number of years, only
reCently has legislation been enacted. This is because some legislators have relied on the
courts to fashion existing criminal laws to combat computer abuse. For examples of cases
which have tried to construe existing law to extend to computer cases, see Gemignani,
supra note 2, at 55-67. See generally Comment, supra note 6, at 394-95 (addressing specific
examples of computer crimes which courts have been willing to classify as within federal
criminal statutes). But see Taber, On Computer Crime (Senate Bill S. 240), 1 COMPUTER/
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were introduced in the lOist Congress. 10 The intent of these laws is to
deter individuals from unauthorized access to the protected systems
and to create penalties for such behavior.ll Collectively, these laws
treat computer systems as property worthy of protection against tres
pass and conversion.
Given the pervasiveness of computer systems and American soci
ety's dependence on them, the increased attention to unauthorized
computer access is warranted. Focusing solely on the perpetrators of
computer fraud, however, is unlikely to prevent access by unauthor
ized individuals or provide compensation for injured parties. 12 For
example, perpetrators from abroad might not be within the reach of
state and federal laws. 13 Skilled individuals will always be able to pen
etrate computer systems, and a single individual or a small group of
individuals would likely be unable to compensate injured parties, even
if they were within the jurisdictional purview of the statute. 14 .
Although individual intruders may attack computer systems at
random, IS the more dangerous computer criminals are likely to be in~
L.J. 517, 518 (1979) ("[T]here is no such thing as a 'computer' crime, and therefore no need
for special legislation addressing this ·problem.' ").
Likewise, some commentators have advanced the theory of extending the constitu
tional right of privacy, the common law right of privacy, and the right of privacy by statute
to prevent computer abuse. Tunick, supra note 4, at 332-38.
10. The two bills, H.R. 55, Virus Eradication Act, and H.R. 287, Computer Protec
tion Act, were both intended to tighten protection of computer systems. While there is no
unanimity about the need for computer crime statutes, the U.S. Government Accounting
Office has charged that existing law is inadequate. See U.S. GOVERNMENT GENERAL Ac
COUNTING OFFICE, PUB. No. GAO/lMTEC-89-57, CoMPUTER SECURITY: VIRUS HIGH"
LIGHTS NEED FOR IMPROVED INTERNET SECURITY (1989). One person h~ been charg~
under the 1986 Computer Fraud and Abuse Act for releasing a program that interfered .
with the operation of thousands of computers. See Wilke, Student Indicted on Charge
Linked to Computer Virus, Wall St. J., July 27, 1989, at B7, col. 5.
For a summary of bills which Congress has considered, see Branscomb, supra note 6,
at 48-49; Taber, supra note 9, at 518; Note, Computer Abuse, supra note 5, at 84-,89.
11. According to one commentator, "the focus of legislation should be on the nature
of the asset subject to loss, rather than on the technology which is rapidly subject to obso
lescence and requires repeated amendment." Note, Bridging the Gap, supra note 2, at 208.
12. Samuelson, Can Hackers Be Suedfor Damages Caused by Computer Vi~es?, 32
CoMM. OF THE ACM 666, 667 (1989).
13. See Stoll, Stalking the Wily Hacker, 31 CoMM. OF THE ACM 484, 489-90 (1988),
for an account of the lengthy tracing of a German hacker's intrusion into American com
puter networks.
14. See Spafford, Crisis and Aftermath, 32 COMM. OF THE ACM 678, 678-~7 (989),
for an account of the chaos on Internet, an American computer network, caused by l!, single
intruder.
.

15. See generally Branscomb, supra note 6, at 6-30 (discussing several incidents in
volving rogue behavior in computer networks and the motivation behind these events).
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siders who have some legitimate access to the system. 16 Ironically,
organizations have been reluctant to prosecute insiders for fear of em
barrassing pUblicity over the vulnerabilities of organizational com
puter systems. 17 Thus, society should not assume that laws addressing
unauthorized use of computer·systems will be sufficient protection for
users.
In addition to legislating sanctions for perpetrators of computer
break-ins, it is also appropriate to examine the responsibilities of peo
ple and entities providing and managing computer systems. Accord
ing to one expert, Clifford Stoll, poor systems management
contributed significantly to a recent trespass into military networks. IS
Stoll noted that after ten months of tracking the intruder, who at
tacked about 450 computers and successfully entered more than thirty
of them, "[m]ost of these break-ins were possible because the intruder
exploited common blunders [made] by vendors, users, and system
managers."19 He also noted, "[t]he security weaknesses of both sys
tems and networks, particularly the needless vulnerability due to
sloppy systems management and administration, result in a surprising
success rate for unsophisticated attacks. "20
Others have noted that lax implementation of security features
and ineffective operating procedures make unauthorized access to
computer systems simple. 21 Usually the damage is only to the system
itself in the form of lost or destroyed data. Sometimes, however, per
sonal injury may result. For example, Stoll stated that the same in
truder who entered the military networks also accessed a computer
which controlled the "real-time" administration of medical treatment.
Had the intruder not been detected, a patient may have been severely
injured. 22
In a more widely publicized incident, a college student infected
Internet, a network of computers for scientific research, with a pro
16. For examples of insiders who have caused computer abuse, see Tunick, supra
note 4, at 328-30.

17. The Real Target, Computerworld, Feb. 27, 1989, at 20, col. 1.
18. Stoll, supra note 13, at 484.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 492.
21. T. EISENBERG, D. GRIES, J. HARTMANIS, D. HOLCOMB, M. LYNN & T. SAN
TORO, THE COMPUTER WORM: A REPORT TO THE PROVOST OF CORNELL UNIVERSITY
ON AN INVESTIGATION CoNDUCTED BY THE COMMISSION OF PRELIMINARY ENQUIRY
(Feb. 6, 1989) [hereinafter CoRNELL UNIVERSITY]; Denning, The Science of Computing:
Computer Viruses, 76 AM. SCIENTIST 236, 238 (1988).

22.

Stoll, supra note 13, at 489.
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gram that reproduced itself on thousands of computers. 23 The result
was a disruption of normal activities and network connectivity for
over a week. 24 In another incident, an ex-employee of an insurance
and brokerage firm was convicted of a felony for planting a computer
time bomb in his former employer's computer system that was in
tended to erase payroll data once a month. 2s Clearly, there exists a
growing number of incidents in which third parties are placed at risk
due to unauthorized access to and misuse of organizational computer
systems.
Even though it is impossible to maintain perfectly secure sys
tems,26 managers have a duty to provide reasonably secure systems by
exercising care in the implementation and operation of their systems. 27
Part I of this article addresses the scope of potential negligence liabil
ity for the providers of computer services who fail to exercise reason
able care in securing and protecting their computer systems from
unauthorized access. 28 Part II of the article describes steps computer
23. For another account ofthis incident, see Note, Computer Viruses, supra note 2, at
625-26.
24. See generally CoRNELL UNIVERSITY, supra note 21; Rochlis & Eichin, With Mi
croscope and Tweezers: The Worm from MIT's Perspective, 32 CoMM. OF THE ACM 689
(1989); Spafford, supra note 14, at 678; How Computer Science Was Caught Off Guard by
One Young Hacker, Wall St. J., Nov. 7, 1988, at AI, col. 1.
25. Savage, Computer Time Bomb Defused; Felon Nailed, Computerworld, Sept. 26,
1988, at 2, col. 4.
26. Perfectly secure systems would keep out authorized users too and hence would
be of no use to their owners.
27. For tips on devising and implementing an effective computer' system, see Com
ment, supra note 6, at 404-15. But see Note, Legal Antibiotic, supra note 3, at 254 ("In
creased security measures are only a partial solution because they serve to create a more
inviting challenge to the person compelled to demonstrate his computer programming
skill.").
28. See infra notes 30-106 and accompanying text.
When an unknown and unauthorized "hacker" accesses personal data held by a pri
vate enterprise, the enterprise itself is the victim's only source of recovery. As one author
noted:
There are several possible theories under which a victim may proceed. Gen
erally, however, recovery is unlikely. Even if an enterprise owes a duty of care to
another, it will not be liable for the tortious acts of third parties unless those acts
were "reasonably foreseeable." In the past, this phrase has been narrowly con
strued, making it difficult for a victim to recover his loss.
Breach of contract is another alternative. An enterprise is held to the degree
of skill possessed by ordinary members of that trade or business. If it fails to meet
this level of care, it may be liable in contract. However, courts rarely extend
protection for conduct not recognized within the professional community or ex
pressly covered by the terms of the agreement; thus, unless an individual includes
an express level of care in the contract, recovery is tenuous.
Regardless of whether liability is founded in tort or contract, however, it is
first necessary to determine what general standards of care are expected from
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managers might take to satisfy a duty of reasonable care to safeguard
the systems they manage. 29
I.

POTENTIAL LIABILITY FOR NEGLIGENCE

Individuals who gain unauthorized access to computer systems
may be criminally30 and civilly liable for their actions. It is also true,
however, that in each of the cases noted above there were steps the
computer systems manager could have taken to significantly lessen the
ease with which the intruder gained access to the affected computer
system. In the case involving the Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory
(LBL) and medical treatment break-ins, the systems manager did not
enforce password expiration, require non-obvious passwords, delete
expired accounts, or eliminate shared accounts. Taken together, these
precautions would have reduced the risk of unauthorized access. 31 In
the Internet incident, the intruder exploited documented flaws in ven
businesses which hold confidential data. If the injured party can prove the enter
prise failed to exercise the standard of care required, he may recover. The prob
lem is that there are no generally accepted standards with which to ascertain the
degree of security required of any business. Thus, practitioners must persuasively
argue that the business failed to meet even the most basic level of protection.
Agranoff, Curb on Technology: Liability for Failure to Protect Computerized Data Against
Unauthorized Access, 5 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 263, 268 (1989)
(footnotes omitted); see also Ware, Computer Security Standards for Government and In
dustry: Where Will They Come From?, COMPUTER SECURITY J. 71 (1983).
29. See infra notes 107-44 and accompanying text.
30. Betts, Senate Takes Tentative Look at Virus Legislation, Computerworld, May
22, 1989, at 8, col. 3. Existing federal laws generally require proof of criminal intent and
damage, making prosecution of some intruders, for example, the perpetrator of the Internet
worm, difficult. New legislation has been proposed to fill this gap. See supra note 10 and
accompanying text.
31. Stoll, supra note 13, at 490. Other possible security measures include:
(1) Even if there is a general password to access a ... file, each authorized indi
vidual should also have a password that is unique and not known to other individ
uals; (2) The password should not be a proper name, common . . . term
[associated with the business], or other easily-guessed item. It should be changed
regularly. These mandates should be ·enforced by software; (3) After a small
number of incorrect passwords, the line into the computer should be disconnected
and security personnel promptly notified; (4) Encryption should be considered if
extremely sensitive data is involved; (5) A contingency plan should be developed
and tested in the event that phone lines into the computer are down for an ex
tended period of time, ensuring that the computer can be updated "on site;" (6)
Access control software should clearly define what users can access what data,
under what conditions, and supported by a proper chain of authorized signatures;
(7) Violation reports should be manageable and designed to produce adequate
follow-up action; (8) Regular audits of computer security should be conducted by
personnel trained in technical and administrative techniques, who are not em
ployed by the data processing department.
Agranoff, supra note 28, at 271 n.20. In addition, one commentator urges education on
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dor-supplied software for which there were known remedies. 32 In the
payroll case, the company took cursory but not thorough steps to deny
access to the former employee. 33
Since the actual wrongdoers in cases like these may not have the
resources to compensate those injured by computer fraud, injured
plaintiffs are likely to look for deeper pockets for their compensation.
Managers with responsibility for an organization's computer systems
may learn that their inexperience, lack of knowledge, or simple pro
crastination in protecting their systems will expose their organizations
to civil liability for negligence in the operation of the systems.
A. Analysis of Negligence Actions Against Managers 34
Many computer systems managers would be appalled to learn
that the actions of individuals obtaining unauthorized access to their
systems could expose their employers to liability for resulting dam
ages. Nonetheless, although there are no recorded cases on point,3S
general principles of negligence36 provide precedent for the imposition
computer abuse to bring computer crime under control. Note, Abuse Act, supra note 1, at
84-86.
32. Spafford, supra note 14, at 678-84.
33. Savage, supra note 25, at 2.
34. This article focuses on the potential liabilities of information systems managers.
For an analysis of similar issues surrounding electronic bulletin board managers, see Soma,
. Smith & Sprague, Legal Analysis 0/ Electronic Bulletin Board Activities, 7 w. NEW ENG. L.
REv. 571 (1985).
35. A case, however, decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit is worth noting in this context. Thompson v. San Antonio Retail Merchants Ass0
ciation, 682 F.2d 509 (5th Cir. 1982) concerns a claim based on the Fair Credit Reporting
Act (the "Act"), 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (1988). Section 16810 of the Act states that a consumer
reporting agency is liable to consumers in the event of failure to'comply with the require
ments of the Act. Among its requirements, the Act provides: "Whenever a consumer
reporting agency prepares a consumer report it shall follow reasonable procedures to assure
maximum possible accuracy of the information concerning the individual about whom the
report relates." 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) (1988) (emphasis added).
In Thompson, the plaintiff argued that the San Antonio Retail Merchants Association
(SARMA) had failed to implement reasonable computer practices, and, as a result, had
provided erroneous credit reports to several organizations from which he attempted to ob
tain credit. Thompson, 682 F.2d at 511-12.
The trial court held that SARMA "failed to exercise reasonable care in programming
its computer to automatically capture information into a file." Id. at 513.
Although the basis of liability in the case is a federal statute rather than a common law
negligence claim, it is significant that the court recognized that misuse of computers, based
on a reasonable-person standard, could be the basis of liability for the provider of computer
services.
36. See generally Comment, "Computer Malpractice" and Other Legal Problems
Posed by Computer "Vaporware", 33 VILL. L. REV. 835, 892 (1988) (advocating that "the
judiciary should be more amenable to computer tort claims, and adopt computer malprac
tice as a viable cause of action").
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of liability on systems managers. 37
"[N]egligence is defined as 'the failure to exercise that degree of
care that an ordinarily prudent person would exercise under the same
or similar circumstances and when charged with like duty.' "38 In or
der for the provider of computer services to be deemed legally negli
gent,39 the injured party would have to prove the traditionally
recognized elements of negligence: that the provider of computer serv
ices had a duty to the injured party to exercise reasonable care in the
creation, installation, or operation of the computer system; that the
systems manager breached that duty by failing to exercise the requisite
care; that the breach of that duty was the proximate cause of the in
jury to the plaintiff; and that the plaintiff did in fact suffer physical
injury, property damage or economic harm as a result of the breach. 40
1.

Duty of Reasonable Care

To hold a systems manager's employer liable for negligence, the
plaintiff must first establish that the company, in the person of the
systems manager, owed a duty to the plaintiff to exercise reasonable or
ordinary care in providing computer services. 41 Reasonable care is
37. See Fossett, The Development of Negligence in Computer Law, 14 N. Ky. L.
REv. 289, 293-95 (1987) (arguing that negligence on the part of a computer user is appro
priately addressed by a claim in tort).
38. Tharpe v. Brewer, 7 N.C. App. 432, 438, 172 S.E.2d 919,924 (1970) (quoting
Williamson v. Clay, 243 N.C. 337, 345, 90 S.E.2d 727, 733 (1956».
39. One commentator described negligence as follows:
Negligence. Negligence occurs when an individual has failed to exercise pre
scribed duties or has failed to carry out those duties in a prudent manner. Negli
gence may arise because of either nonfeasance or malfeasance, and may be the
result of an error of commission or omission on the part of [those] ... defending a
lawsuit.

Courts will be looking at the question of negligence in order to decide
whether it was of such a nature as to be considered "ordinary" or "gross." Ordi
nary negligence normally involves an act or a failure to act that resulted from
simple carelessness or basic human error. At the other extreme, gross negligence
involves what the court finds to be a reckless, willful, or wanton act or failure to
act in view of the circumstances. . . . In computer fraud cases, the existence of
scienter, or intent, on the part of the defendants may hinge on whether the negli
gence is adjudged to be ordinary or gross, the implication being that gross negli
gence translates to intent.
L. KRAUSS & A. MACGAHAN, COMPUTER FRAUD'AND COUNTERMEASURES 337 (1979).
40. W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 30, at 164-65
(1984).
One commentator has noted that "the modern computer is not, for the most part in its
current use today, a physically dangerous machine." Fossett, supra note 37, at 291. Conse
quently, computers do not usually cause physical injury or property damage. Id.
41. "[E]very case is governed by the rule of general application that all persons are
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generally defined as that degree of care that a similarly situated rea
sonable person would exercise. 42 The duty of reasonable care has lim
its: the injured party must typically show that the defendant owed
both a duty to the plaintiff and a duty to act or refrain from acting to
avoid foreseeable harm. The concept of duty is a limitation on the
scope of liability.43 Thus, duty imposes an obligation only towards
those who would be foreseeably endangered and oruy with respect to
those risks or hazards that are reasonably foreseeable. The manager of
a computer system wou1d have a duty to use reasonable care to secure
the system44 when it is reasonably foreseeable that failure to secure it
would result in injury to others. While "others" encompasses a poten
tially unlimited group, there are limits on how far liability would ex
tend. A duty of care runs oruy to "foreseeable plaintiffs," any person
or class of persons who could reasonably be expected to be injured by
the systems manager's negligence. Although the manager's scope of
duty is also limited to the kinds of injury that could reasonably be
foreseen, the exact manner in which the injury is brought about need
not be foreseeable. 4s The presence or absence of a systems manager's
duty to protect a plaintiff will be a function of the facts of a particular
required to use ordinary care to prevent others from being injured as a result of their con
duct." J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 24 Cal. 3d 799,806,598 P.2d 60, 64, 157 Cal. Rptr. 407,
411 (1979) (quoting Weirum v. RKO Gen., Inc., 15 Cal. 3d 40, 46, 539 P.2d 36, 39, 123
Cal. Rptr. 468, 471 (1975».
42. "[N]egligence 'consists in a want of that reasonable care which would be exer
cised by a person of ordinary prudence under a/l the existing circumstances . ...'" Gowdy
v. United States, 271 F. Supp. 733, 738 (W.O. Mich. 1967) (quoting Detroit & M.R.R. v.
Van Steinburg, 17 Mich. 99, 118-19 (1868», rev'd 412 F.2d 525, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 960
(1969).
43. 3 F. HARPER, F. JAMES & O. GRAY, THE LAW OF TORTS § 18.2 (1986).
44. There are various methods to protect a computer system, for example:
Numerous security measures have been suggested for safeguarding the computer
system from criminal attack. Some experts suggest that the system itself be kept
under guard and be isolated from the other divisions of a fum. It is suggested,
further, that the programmer not operate the computer. In addition, experts note
that no employee should have access for too long a period of time to anyone stage
of the computer's operation. Access should be on a need-to-know basis only.
However, a computer can be safeguarded but never made fully impregnable.
The primary factor behind computerization has been the economic motive.
Extreme security measures could easily nullify the economic feasibility of a com
puter system.... There is a need for deterrence, which only law enforcement and
prosecution can provide. However, at present, our investigatory and
prosecutorial machinery has been slow to adapt to this new form of crime.
A. BEQUAI, WHITE-COLLAR CRIME: A 2Ch"H-CENTURY CRISIS 109 (1978) (endnotes
omitted).
45. See, e.g., R. KEETON, LEGAL CAUSE IN THE LAW OF TORTS 49-61 (1963).
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case. 46
2.

Breach of Duty

Next, a potential plaintiff must show that a manager breached his
or her duty of reasonable care. A systems manager might be found to
have breached a duty of reasonable care for a number of reasons, such
as the failure to recognize defects in a system, the failure to correct
defects, or the failure to warn of defects.47 Because of the number of
ways a computer can malfunction, proving negligence will be diffi
cult.48 Breach of duty might also arise from failure to train and super
vise employees,49 or the failure to use reasonable means to secure the
system from unauthorized and unintended use.
3.

Proximate Cause of Injury

The third element of a negligence claim is proof that the defend
ant's act, or failure to act, was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's
injury. 50 Stated generally, satisfying the element of proximate cause
requires first, that the defendant's action be an actual cause, and sec
ond, that the consequences of that act were foreseeable. 51 Finally, the
plaintiff will need to prove that he or she was a foreseeable victim. 52
There can be more than one proximate cause of an injury.53 For ex
ample, in the case of the Internet intruder,54 the cause in fact of the
injury was the illegal or unauthorized act of accessing the computers
46. "The circumstances of each case supply the features from which breaches of duty
and negligence arise." Gowdy v. United States, 271 F. Supp. 733, 738 (W.O. Mich. 1967).
47. "There can be little doubt that the use of computer resources is changing the
practice standards [of design engineers]. It is not difficult today to anticipate the misuse of
computerized resources as negligence." Lurie & Weiss, Computer Assisted Mistakes:
Changing Standards of Professional Liability, 2 SOFTWARE L.J. 283, 285 (1988).
48. Note, Easing Plaintiffs' Burden of Proving Negligence for Computer Malfunction,
69 IOWA L. REV. 241 (1983) (proposing a liberal use of the "res ipsa loquitur" doctrine in
computer injury claims).
.
49. 3 F. HARPER, F. JAMES & O. GRAY, supra note 43, at § 18.7.
50. W. KEETON, supra note 40, § 30, at 165. For a complete overview of the causa
tion issue in the common law, see Kratzke, The Convergence of the Discretionary Function
Exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act With Limitations of Liability in Common Law
Negligence, 60 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 221, 228-32 (1986).
51. The concept of "proximate cause" is subject to varied definitions. Black's Law
Dictionary states that "[a]n injury or damage is proximately caused by an act, or a failure
to act, whenever it appears from the evidence in the case, that the act or omission played a
substantial part in bringing about or actually causing the injury or damage; and that the
injury or damage was either a direct result or a reasonably probable consequence of the act
or omission." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1225 (6th ed. 1990).
52. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
53. W. KEETON, supra note 40, § 44, at 301-02.
54. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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on the Internet network, but the insufficient security system was also a
cause. Even where the intervening act is illegal and unauthorized, a
provider of computer services may not be relieved from liability for
negligence due to failure to restrict access to a system. 55 If it was rea
sonably foreseeable that the system might be sabotaged, the manager
will be required to use reasonable means to protect against intrusion.
While the manager cannot be required to impose absolute security, he
or she should be charged with implementing reasonable access control.
Reasonableness can be determined by several factors. 56 First; the
amount of caution required increases with the likelihood of injury.57
Second, as the severity of possible harm increases, the duty to protect
against the harm likewise increases. 58 Thus, greater and more com
prehensive measures would be expected for a system with critical or
sensitive data. Third, the cost of avoiding foreseeable harm is also
relevant. 59 The cost of protection will be balanced against the degree
of risk and the seriousness of the possible resulting harm. 6O Where the
cost of protection in time or money is low, there may be a duty to
protect against even remote risks. 61 The manager will not be negli
gent, however, where the cost of restricting access is significantly out
of proportion to the risks. 62
As previously noted, a negligent or willful act, such as introduc
ing a virus into a computer, could be th~ cause in fact of the resulting
damage, such as altered or destroyed files or a system shutdown due to
overload. The individual who introduces the virus may face criminal
liability under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act,63 as well as civil
55. See infra note 64 and accompanying text.
56. Reasonableness is often a function of cost. For example, one commentator
noted:
Computer security generally is concerned with the implementation of controls to
meet exposures. Normally, however, only cost effective controls are consid
ered.... Such a process is usually termed a risk assessment or risk analysis. It is
virtually impossible with current technology to determine precisely the total set of
exposures, the potential annualized loss from each exposure, the true cost of
often-overlapping controls, and the resulting reduced annualized loss from each
exposure. Therefore, in practice, controls are generally implemented only after
an exposure occurs and is recognized as a problem by management.
Agranoff, supra note 28, at 282-83 (footnotes omitted).
57. 3 F. HARPER, F. JAMES & O. GRAY, supra note 43, § 16.9, at 469.
58. Id. at 471.
59. Id. at 477; see also Agranoff, supra note 28, at 276-308.
60. 3 F. HARPER, F. JAMES & O. GRAY, supra note 43, § 57, at 477.
Id.
Id.
63. See. e.g., Alexander, Morris Indicted in Internet Affair, Computerworld, July 31,
1989. at 8, col. 1. Robert T. Morris, who allegedly planted a worm which shut down
61.
62.
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penalties. But the provider of computer services may also be liable,
unless the acts of the first individual are deemed to be superseding,
which would cut off the provider's liability.64 The provider's liability
will depend upon the scope of the original foreseeable risk that the
manager created through lax security practices. "If the intervening
cause is one which in ordinary human experience is reasonably to be
anticipated, or one which the defendant has reason to anticipate under
the particular circumstances, the defendant may be negligent, among
other reasons, because of failing to guard against it. "65 Because the
courts generally agree that only foreseeable causes of harm will not
supersede the defendant manager's liability,66 the provider of com
puter serviceS will be liable only if the intervening cause was foresee
able. 67 Once it is determined that the systems manager has a duty to
anticipate the intervening misconduct and guard against it, this mis
conduct cannot supersede the liability of a provider of computer
services. 68
The same result would follow even if the hacker's actions consti
tuted criminal conduct. Normally, one may proceed upon the as
sumption that others will obey the law. 69 However, where past
experience indicates that criminal conduct should reasonably be antic
ipated, and especially when the potential injury is serious, the systems
manager is presumably still liable to those harmed by the failure to
safeguard the system. 70 Dean William Prosser cites the following as
thousands of computers on the nationwide Internet network, is the first person to face
federal prosecution under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986. In January, 1990,
Robert Morris was found "guilty of illegally running a worm program on thousands of
computers scattered across the country." Alexander, Morris Verdict Stirs Debate, Com
puterworld, Jan. 29, 1990, at I, col. 3.
64. The act of a third person in committing an intentional tort or crime is a
superseding cause of harm to another resulting therefrom, although the actor's
negligent conduct created a situation which afforded an opportunity to the third
person to commit such a tort or crime, unless the actor at the time of his negligent
conduct realized or should have realized the likelihood that such a situation
might be created, and that a third person might avail himself of the opportunity
to commit such a tort or crime.
REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 448 (1965).
65. W. KEETON, supra note 40, § 44, at 303 (footnote omitted).
66. Id. at 303-04.
67. Id. at 302.
68. Id. at 305.
69. W. KEETON, supra note 40, § 33, at 198-99; see, e.g., Watson v. Kentucky &
I.B.R.R. Co., 137 Ky. 619, 126 S.W. 146 (1910) (criminal act of another was the interven
ing act that broke the chain of causation).
70. The criminal conduct of others does not break the chain of causation where there
have been prior similar criminal incidents. See 3 F. HARPER, F. JAMES & O. GRAY, supra
note 43, § 16.12, at 495-96.
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common examples of this concept: "if valuable property is left un
guarded and exposed to the public view, it may be anticipated that it
will be stolen; if the key is left in the lock of a jewelry store over a
holiday, it is not at all unlikely that there will be a burglary."71
Similarly, if a computer system is left unprotected, it is likely that
information in that system will be stolen, altered, or lost. With the
risk of misconduct clearly foreseeable, the manager must use reason
able means to restrict access to the system.
4.

Injury

The final element a plaintiff must prove in a negligence action is
that he or she has suffered an injury.72 This element raises an interest
ing issue in computer cases in that the injuries suffered are often purely
economic. 73 While one can readily envision circumstances in which a
security breach or a software malfunction could result in physical in
jury,14 most of the injuries will be economic.75 The exact form or
manner of conceivable injuries is virtually unlimited.
Traditionally, English and American courts have denied negli
gence claims for purely economic losses. 76 This prohibition, some
times called the per se prohibitory rule,77 bars recovery for economic
losses unaccompanied by physical injury or property damage. 78 The
71. W. KEETON, supra note 40, § 33, at 203.
72. Id. § 30, at 165.
73. See, e.g., Office Supply Co. v. BasiclFour Corp., 538 F. Supp. 776 (E.D. Wis.
1982) (California law does not allow recovery for economic loss in computer-related negli
gence claim.).
74. See generally Massingale & Borthick, Risk Allocation for Injury Due to Defective
Medical Software, 11 J. PROD. LIAB. 181 (1988), for a discussion of physical injury and
death which resulted from software malfunction involving the use of computer-assisted
radiation therapy. For a discussion of injuries involved in computer use in engineering, see
Lurie & Weiss, supra note 47.
75. See generally Reed, Negligence and Computer Software, 1987 J. Bus. L. 444.
76. Note, TORTS-DAMAGE~New Jersey Recognizes Negligence Action for
Purely Economic Losses Unaccompanied by Physical Harm-People Express Airlines, Inc.
v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 100 N.J. 246,495 A.2d 107 (1985), 17 SETON HALL L. REv.
719 (1987) [hereinafter Note, New Jersey]; see also Harvey, Economic Losses and Negli
gence, 50 CANADIAN B. REV. 580, 581-82 (1972); James, Limitations on Liability for Eco
nomic Loss Caused by Negligence: A Pragmatic Appraisal, 25 VAND. L. REv. 43, 45-46
(1972).
77. Note, Purely Economic Loss: A Standard for Recovery, 73 IOWA L. REv. 1181,
1188 (1988) [hereinafter Note, Purely Economic Loss] (reviewing the history of the per se
rule); Note, New Jersey, supra note 76, at 719; see also People Express Airlines v. Consoli
dated Rail Corp., 100 N.J. 246, 251, 495 A.2d 107, 109 (1985).
78. Note, Purely Economic Loss, supra note 77, at 1182 n.3 (listing the leading cases
barring recovery for purely economic loss); see also People Express Airlines, 100 N.J. at 251,
495 A.2d at 109; Note, New Jersey, supra note 76, at 719.
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policy reasons for limiting or denying recovery for purely economic
loss were based, in part, on the fear of exposing a defendant to unlim
ited liability, which might be too severe given his conduct,79 However,
there are numerous problems with this position, and in recent years
courts have used several alternative lines of reasoning to limit the
scope of liability while at the same time creating numerous exceptions
to the per se prohibitory rule. 80
Some of the early cases that allowed recovery for purely economic
harm absent physical injury limited the scope of liability of the defend
ant by requiring a special relationship between the tortfeasor and a
foreseeable plaintiff. 81 Eventually, some courts began to focus on fore
seeability rather than physical damages as a means of limiting liability,
even when a special relationship did not exist. 82
The physical harm rule was traditionally premised on policy con
cerns of preventing mass litigation, fraudulent claims, and liability dis
proportionate to the defendant's fault. 83 The physical harm rule,
however, was intended to limit, not deny, recovery for economic
79. Dente, Negligence Liability to All Foreseeable Parties for Pure Economic Harm:
The Final Assault Upon the Citadel, 21 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 587, 589 (1987); Rabin,
Tort Recovery for Negligently Inflicted Economic Loss: A Reassessment, 37 STAN. L. REV.
1513, 1534 (1985); Note, Recent Cases, 88 HARV. L. REv. 444, 448 (1974).
80. See Sharon Steel Corp. v. Lakeshore Inc., 753 F.2d 851, 856 (1Oth Cir. 1985)
(economic losses allowed under New Mexico law); Babson Bros. Co. v. Tipstar Corp., 446
N.E.2d 11, 15 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983) (economic loss allowed if proximately caused); Groppel
Co. v. United States Gypsum Co., 616 S.W.2d 49, 58 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (economic loss
allowed without accompanying physical damage). See generally James, Economic Loss:
The Floodgates, 1987 DENNING L.J. 97 (discussing three rationales which courts have used:
reasonable foresight, economic loss recovery only where accompanied by injury to person
or property, and the loss/reliance mechanism).
81. See. e.g., Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961)
(tort liability may be based on relationship between attorney who drafted will negligently
and plaintiffs who lost inheritance as a result), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1962); Rozny v.
Mamul, 43 III. 2d 54, 250 N.E.2d 656 (1969) (finding tort liability where error by land
surveyor resulted in substantial costs to plaintiff purchaser of house despite the fact that
survey was not contracted for by plaintiffs); Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E.
275 (1922) (tort liability may be based on relationship between public weighers of merchan
dise who erroneously certified weight of product and purchasers of product).
82. J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 24 Cal. 3d 799, 804, 598 P.2d 60, 63, 157 Cal. Rptr.
407,410 (1979) (finding tort liability on part of building contractor where renovations took
excessive amount of time and cost plaintiff lessee lost revenues, because it was foreseeable
that defendant's activity would affect plaintiff); H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 93 N.J. 324,
352, 461 A.2d 138, 153 (1983) (liability established where stockholder suffered loss from
independent auditor's inaccurate public statement).
83. People Express Airlines v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 100 N.J. 246, 252, 495 A.2d
107, lIO (1985) (construing Kinsman Transit Co. v. City of Buffalo, 388 F.2d 821, 823 (2d
Cir. 1968»; see also Note, Purely Economic Loss, supra note 77, at 1190-94.
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loss.84 In People Express Airlines v. Consolidated Rail Corporation,8S
the New Jersey Supreme Court cited several objectives to be furthered
in allowing recovery for purely economic harm within certain parame
ters. These objectives included the need to compensate innocent vic
tims for their injury, the need to discourage similar negligent behavior
in the future, the need to foster safer products, a desire to vindicate
reasonable conduct that shows regard for safety, and the need to shift
costs of dangerous activities to those better able to sustain such
costs.86
In an effort to balance these competing objectives, the New Jersey
Supreme Court specifically rejected the per se prohibitory rule and al
lowed People Express Airlines to pursue its claim for purely economic
loss when a railway accident caused a tank car containing flammable
liquid to spill into a freight yard and ignite. 87 The spill, which
presented a threat of explosion and other health hazards, forced the
evacuation of the area within a one-mile radius of the accident site. 88
Although the fire was contained and an explosion never occurred, the
accident forced the People Express Airlines' reservation office, located
in the affected area, to interrupt its business operations for twelve
hours, which resulted in substantial financial losses. 89 The New Jersey
Supreme Court upheld the appellate court's decision, which found
that recovery was not automatically barred by the absence of physical
damages. 9o The New Jersey Supreme Court stressed that recovery for
purely economic losses would be limited to plaintiffs, or classes of
plaintiffs, whom the defendant knew or had reason to know would
likely suffer damages due to the defendant's conduct. 91 The People
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

People Express Airlines, 100 N.J. at 254, 495 A.2d at 111.
100 N.J. 246, 495 A.2d 107 (1985).
Id. at 255, 495 A.2d at 111.
Id. at 267-68, 495 A.2d at 118.
Id. at 249, 495 A.2d at 108.
Id. at 249-50, 495 A.2d at 108-09.
Id. at 250, 495 A.2d at 109.
The New Jersey Supreme Court stated:
We conclude therefore that a defendant who has breached his duty of care to
avoid the risk of economic injury to particularly foreseeable plaintiffs may be held
liable for actual economic losses that are proximately caused by its breach of
duty. In this context, those economic losses are recoverable as damages when
they are the natural and probable consequence of a defendant's negligence in the
sense that they are reasonably to be anticipated in view of defendant's capacity to
have foreseen that the particular plaintiff or identifiable class of plaintiffs ... is
demonstrably within the risk created by defendant's negligence.
Id. at 267, 495 A.2d at 118.
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Express decision illustrates that the courts can effectively limit the
scope of liability for economic harm without requiring physical injury.
One difficulty in allowing recovery for property damage, but not
for economic loss, is that the distinction between the two is unconvinc
ing. 92 For example, if a car is negligently damaged, the owner com
plains about the cost of repair - an economic loss.93 The requirement
of physical injury to person or property before compensation for eco
nomic loss may lead to obviously unjust results:
[T]he distinction between physical and economic loss brings us to
the ridiculous point that if the same plaintiff suffers economic loss
arising out of a physical injury and also similar economic loss (but
not arising from physical injury) in consequence of the same wrong
ful act[,] he can recover under the one head but not under the
other. 94

In lieu of requiring physical damage as a means of limiting the
defendant's scope of liability, many courts have required that the de
fendant's duty be limited by contract law. Where parties have volun
tarily entered into a relationship having the features of a contract, the
law enforces only those terms agreed to in the bargain. With respect
to negligence in the provision of computer services, it may be that to
impose duties that were never mutually assented to by the parties
would be inherently wrong. 95
92. Edmeades, The Citadel Stands: The Recovery of Economic Loss in American
Products Liability, 27 CASE W. REs. 647, 651 (1977); Fallon, Physical Injury and Economic
Loss - The Fine Line of Distinction Made Clearer, 27 VILL. L. REv. 483, 484-85 (1981
82); James, supra note 80, at 103.
93. James, supra note 80, at 103. Consider also the example given by Judge Kauf
man in Kinsman Transit Co. v. City of Buffalo, 388 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968):
To anyone familiar with N. Y. traffic there can be no doubt that a foreseeable
result of an accident in the Brooklyn Battery Tunnel during rush hour is that
thousands of people will be delayed. A driver who negligently caused such an
accident would certainly be held accountable to those physically injured in the
·crash. But we doubt that damages would be recoverable against the negligent
driver in favor of truckers or contract carriers who suffered provable losses be
cause of the delay or to the wage earner who was forced to "clock in" an hour
late.' And yet it was surely foreseeable that among the many who wo'uld be
delayed would be truckers and wage earners.
Id. at 825 n.8.
94. James, supra note 80, at 103-04; see also Spartan Steel & Alloys Ltd. v. Martin
(Contractors) Ltd., [1973] Q.B. 27.
95. In an analogous situation, a majority of the members of the Spedal Committee
on Computers and the Law of the New York Bar Association indicated that in cases of
claims against vendors of defective software, resulting in purely economic injuries, "tradi
tional contract law should apply." Special Committee on Computers and the Law, Tort
Theories in Computer Litigation, 38 REC. A. B. CITY N.Y. 426, 427 (1983). Dissenting
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There is some argument that contract theories rather than negli
gence theories should control all computer cases resulting in economic
loss.96 However, this approach does not address the many incidents in
which computer use or malfunction causes injury to third parties who
were not parties to the initial bargain. 97 For example, suppose an un
authorized individual corrupts the files of a credit bureau which issues
an erroneous credit report, causing a bank to deny credit to a business
which then fails due to lack of credit. The damages are essentially
economic, and there is no privity of contract between the business and
the credit bureau. 98 However, to deny recovery in this instance for
lack of privity of contract is fundamentally unfair. Arguably, it would
be more appropriate to allow the injured party to seek recovery in tort
and limit the scope of the credit bureau's liability under concepts of
foreseeability and proximate cause. 99
Although the road to tort recovery for purely economic loss has
been long and circuitous in the American court system,IOO some recent
decisions point toward recovery for economic harm based on reason
able foreseeability.lol While the ability to collect for purely economic
injury is uncertain, tort theories of recovery will continue to be as
serted. The legal system must develop means to address the unique
issues emerging as society rapidly grows more computer-dependent
and the potential for serious economic harm to computer users in
creases. To avoid unjustified liability for the providers of computer
services, careful assessments must be made as to the kinds of precau
tions a systems-manager could reasonably take to safeguard computer
members of the committee were not willing to foreclose the possibility of tort liability in
appropriate circumstances. Id. at 445.
96. See. e.g., Conley, Tort Theories of Recovery Against Vendors of Defective
Software, 13 RUTGERS CoMPUTER & TECH. L.J, 1 (1987); Fossett, supra note 37, at 292;
Gemignani, Product Liability and Software, 8 RUTGERS J. COMPUTERS, TECH. & L. 173,
189-96 (1981); Nycum, Liability for MalfUnction of a Computer Program, 7 RUTGERS J.
CoMPUTERS, TECH & L. 1,9-15 (1979).
97. Fossett, supra note 37, at 291-92 (arguing that this is why computer tort claims
are on the rise).
98. A credit reporting service that misidentified an Individual as a bad credit risk has
been found "negligent by failing to exercise reasonable care when programming its com
puter to capture and disseminate information correctly." See LaPlante, Liability in the
Information Age, INFOWORLD, Aug. 18, 1986, at 37.
99. See supra notes 5007l and accompanying text.
100. See generally Dente, supra note 79 (discussing the evolution of recovery for
purely economic injury); Note, Purely Economic Loss, supra note 77 (regarding the histori
cal and policy basis of the per se rule).
101. See. e.g., J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 24 Cal. 3d 799,598 P.2d 60, 157 Cal. Rptr.
407 (1979); People Express Airlines v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 100 N.J. 246, 495 A.2d 107
(1985); H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 93 N.J. 324,461 A.2d 138 (1983).
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resources. Actioii~ constituting reasonable care on a systems man
ager's part must be defined.
B.

Statute of Limitations

Even where all the elements of a negligence action are present, a
claim for relief may be barred by a statute of limitations. 102
In ordinary negligence actions, the statute begins to run once the
negligent act or omission that caused the damage occurs. 103 However,
when a hacker infiltrates a computer system with a "time bomb,"l04
this will present a different legal problem. Did the harmful act occur
when the hacker first breached the computer's security, when the virus
became active, or when the effect was first realized?
One author suggests the courts resolve this question by analogy to
professional malpractice negligence. lOS The statute of limitations in
many states does not begin to run in malpractice actions until the
"time of discovery." However, to date, no court has adopted the con
cept of "computer malpractice."106
II.

DEFINING THE DuTY OF CARE FOR SYSTEMS MANAGERS

In the event of a suit charging a provider of computer services
with negligence, one of the principal issues to be examined, assuming
the existence of a duty,107 will be whether the systems manager exer
cised reasonable care in safeguarding the computer resources at issue.
This Section will define responsible managerial practices to which the
court may look in determining whether a manager has in fact met the
duty of reasonable care.
102. "Statutes of the federal government and various states setting the maximum
time periods during which certain actioris can be brought or rights enforced. After the time
period set out ... has run, no legal action can be brought ...." BLACK'S LAW DICTION
ARY 927 (6th ed. 1990).
103. See, e.g., H. Hirschfield Sons, Co. v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 107 Mich.
App. 720, 309 N.W.2d 714 (1981) (Where truck scales were negligently installed, the stat
ute ran from the date of the wrong, not when damage occurred.).
104. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
105. Comment, Computer Malpractice: Are Computer Manufacturers, Service Bu
reaus, and Programmers Really the Professionals They Claim to Be?, 23 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 1065, 1089-91 (1983).
106. Triangle Underwriters, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 604 F.2d 737, 744 (2d Cir.
1979) (negligence action regarding computer installation barred by statute of limitations);
see also Chatlos Sys. v. National Cash Register Corp., 479 F. Supp. 738, 740-41 n.l (D.N.J.
1979) ("Simply because an activity is technically complex and important to the business
community does not mean that greater potential liability must attach. . . . [T]he Court
declines the invitation to create a new tort:-'), aff'd, 635 F.2d 1081 (3d Cir. 1980).
107. See supra notes 41-49 and accompanying text.
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Managers must be informed about their syst~ms' vulnerabilities
and must make informed choices about which seCurity provisions to
implement and how to enforce them. As the risk of harm increases,
managers will be expected to use greater care in protecting systems
and verifying the effectiveness of security measures. In general, a
manager's duty may be defined as a duty to select and implement se
curity provisions, to monitor their effectiveness, and to maintain the
provisions in accordance with changing security needs.
Since security features hinder system access and users want sys
tems that are easily accessible, there are conflicts between the need for
security and the desire for ease of use. For example, if passwords are
hard to remember, users are likely to write them down, making the
passwords accessible to potential intruders. Even on the occasion of
substantial harm due to the activities of a network intruder, to8 users
caution against overreacting to real or perceived threats in ways that
jeopardize a system's usefulness. 109 This "cost" in the ease of using
computer systems should be considered in determining whether a
manager has exercised reasonable care. 1 to However, despite this legiti
mate concern for ease of use, it is apparent from a legaJ standpoint
that managers should err on the side of caution.
A. Selecting and Implementing Security Provisions
To select the right combination of security features, managers
must be familiar with the operating systems (control programs that
regulate the use of all system resources), the applications software
(programs that accomplish specific tasks for users), and the interac
tions between operating system and application software. 111 Managers
configure computer systems for their organizations from vendor-pro
vided options and organization-developed enhancements. Thus, man
agers have a responsibility to select the right combination of
parameters and options for their environments prior to their
implementation.
1.

Selection and Implementation Choices

Knowing that their products will be used in a variety of environ
108. See generally Spafford, supra note 14, at 678.
109. King, Overreaction to External A.ttacks on Computer Systems Could Be More
Harmful Than the Viruses Themselves, The Chronicle of Higher Edue., Nov. 23, 1988, at
A36, col. 1.
110. See Agranolf, supra note 28; supra notes 41-49 and accompanying text.
111. See generally 2 M. WOFSEY, ADVANCES IN COMPUTER SECURITY MANAGE
MENT 1-37, 143-59 (1983).
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ments, vendors generally provide customization options which may be
specified at installation time, that permit systems managers to tailor
systems to their organization's needs. 112 In order to facilitate installa
tion, however, vendors often configure systems with default values for
parameters for user priorities, resource use limits, job accounting, and
file protection. Default configurations typically disable available se
curity features, and master accounts typically have default passwords
such as "system" or "test." Intruders usually try default user account
and password values first. Therefore, a manager will be expected to
understand what the default values are and what they imply for secur
ity, choose the appropriate set of options, and replace default pass
words with secure ones. The choices a manager makes must also be
documented. Without such documentation, a computer manager's
successor is likely to inherit a poorly secured system. Consequently,
he will be unaware of its vulnerabilities. I 13
One kind of option in many systems consists of "backdoor en
tryways left over from software development.""4 These paths facili
tate software development by making debugging easier. One such
path, the DEBUG command for verifying receipt of mail at a network
node, was used by the Internet intruder. The command permits the
sender to invoke commands at the recipient node. The Internet in
truder took advantage of this flaw to transmit commands that would
propagate unauthorized programs." S Although backdoor entryways
may be useful and necessary for initial maintenance and debugging,
managers should disable such features before making systems avail
able to their users. Vendors should document such features for cus
tomers so they can make informed choices to enable them to plan for
their use only under controlled operating conditions.
2.

User Education

Since the line between use and misuse of computer systems may
be hard to discern, system managers have a duty to explain to their
users how the application systems are intended to be used and what
restrictions apply to each user. A manager's explanation to users
should include written documentation. 116 In addition to application
112. M. MURPHY & X. PARKER, HANDBOOK OF EDP AUDITING § 27-20 (2d ed.
1989).
113. See Morris & Thompson, Password Security: A Case History, 32 CoMM. OF THE
ACM 594, 596 (1979), for a list of easily guessed passwords.
114. Stoll, supra note 13, at 493.
115. Spafford, supra note 14, at 678-79.
116. McGuire, Product-Use Instructions: How to Evaluate Them in Manufacturer
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documentation, systems managers should make clear to their users
"rules about what is acceptable and unacceptable conduct when using
the system." 117
3.

Access Control

Managers must be aware of the nature of the information in sys
tem files and the extent of the security that is appropriate for different
kinds of files. All files should be subject to periodic backup so that if
they are damaged by an intruder, files can be restored readily.118 Ad
ditionally, managers must know which individuals are authorized, for
what type of access, to what information, and under what conditions.
For example, inventory clerks might be authorized for access only
during their assigned shift with update access to inventory quantities
but read-only access to price data. 119
Moreover, the concern with access authorization should extend
to documentation about systems. 120 With sufficient documentation
available to them, clever intruders may discover how to masquerade as
legitimate users. 121
Managers should be responsible for implementing procedural and
programmed security provisions so that the desired level of control is
achieved in environments where there are many users, where their
passwords are vulnerable to exposure, and where there are software
errors. 122 In addition, an important aspect of security implementation
is separating incompatible functions of authorizing access privileges,
specifying access privileges for individuals to the system, and review
ing records of computer access for patterns of fraudulent activity.
Negligence, 11 J. PROD. LIAB. 293, 293-97 (1988) (discussing manufacturers' product-use
instructions). Systems managers could be thought of as manufacturers for the purpose of
designating the content of user documentation.
117. Samuelson, supra note 12, at 669. Acceptable conduct for computer users
means, for example, their (1) using only those computer accounts authorized for their use
and using them only for the purposes for which they were authorized, (2) making appropri
ate use of system-provided protection features such as passwords and not attempting to
subvert passwords or other restrictions on account use, and (3) accessing the files of others
only with express permission for authorized purposes.
118. R. WEBER, EDP AUDmNG: CoNCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS AND PRACTICE 294
(1988).
119. Id. at 515.
120. Id. at 295.
121. D. PARKER, CRIME By CoMPUTER 59-70 (1976) (access to system documenta
tion enabled outsider to pose as Pacific Bell employee and embezzle equipment from the
company).
122. Murray, Computer-Related Crime and Auditing in the Nineties, II THE EDP
AUDITOR J. 25, 25-30 (1990).

190

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 12:167

Separating these functions means vesting each one in a different indi
vidual or group of individuals.
Access control 123 is typically implemented through user identifi
cation codes ("user IDs") corresponding to user accounts, together
with their associated passwords. User IDs identify individuals, while
passwords allow the individuals to validate themselves as the owners
of the user IDs. Thus, knowledge of user IDs and passwords may
permit intruders to masquerade as authorized individuals. Since user
IDs are generally not subject to even casual protection, knowledge of
passwords is effectively all that intruders require to gain system access.
Historically, users have been careless with passwords. They
choose obvious combinations such as their initials or their spouses'
names and write them down in obvious places. 124 As a result, manag
ers must force periodic password changes so that intruders cannot
guess or detect passwords even with repeated attempts. As intruders
become more sophisticated in deciphering passwords, managers must
take more elaborate security steps, such as encrypting passwords so
that intruders are unlikely to uncover them even with unlimited com
puter time at their disposa1. 12s
A crucial aspect of implementing computer security is mainte
nance of control over the content of all software on the system. 126
Software integrity is vital because if intruders can corrupt software,
especially control programs with system-wide access and privileges,
they can manipulate systems more easily.127 Customary procedures
for assuring software integrity include: restricting access to program
code solely to the employees responsible for implementing and run
ning it; 128 requiring separate developmental and production software
123. See R. WEBER, supra note 118, at 309-56, for a discussion of access control.
124. Observation of the daily security coding in a bank's wire transfer room enabled
a consultant to make an unauthorized wire transfer of $10.2 million from Security Pacific
National Bank. FBI Arrests Suspect In Bank Funds Theft and Finds Diamonds, Wall St. J.,
Nov. 7, 1978, at 24, col. 3.
125. See Morris & Thompson, supra note 113, at 594. The authors describe the need
for and the evolution of increasingly sophisticated password security. In addition to en
crypting passwords, they recommend forcing users to use less predictable passwords, con
cealing the list of encrypted passwords, and using time-consuming encryption algorithms.
Id.
126. F. GALLEGOS, D. RICHARDSON & A. BORTHICK, AUDIT AND CONTROL OF
INFORMATION SYSTEMS 195-96 (1987). Control over software content is important be
cause data integrity depends on programs to do all of what they are supposed to do and
nothing else. If programs are changed surreptitiously, then the perpetrators might be able
to manipulate organizational data for their own purposes.
127. R. WEBER, supra note 118, at 185-86. For example, privileged system software
could be used to gain access to private data that could be sold to competitors.
128. AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS, STATEMENT ON
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libraries;129 requiring management authorization for program changes
and approval for installation;130 and verifying the legitimacy of pro
duction programs on periodic and random bases.13I
B.

Monitoring Effectiveness

The manager has a duty to monitor the effectiveness of the opera
tion of security provisions. Monitoring should include verifying that
security provisions work as intended and analyzing attempted accesses
to identify fraudulent ones. Attempted accesses should be logged for
examination and all suspicious activity should be investigated. 132
Monitoring security effectiveness also encompasses an awareness
of the temptations to individuals for fraudulent activity.133 Individu
als with access to computer systems should be screened, and employee
attitudes and satisfaction should be monitored. 134 There should be a
legitimate grievance procedure for dissatisfied employees - especially
those who actively use the system and have access to computer files.
The most dissatisfied employee may be an ex-employee or someone
about to become an ex-employee. 135 Therefore, managers should im
mediately implement procedures that deny access to terminated em
ployees. 136 For laid-off employees subject to The Worker Adjustment
and Retraining Notification Act· of 1988,137 managers should either
deny access privileges altogether or monitor their activities.
Another problem concerning security effectiveness is system fail
ures. Abrupt system failures create opportunities for compromising
AUDITING STANDARDS No. 55, CONSIDERATION OF THE INTERNAL CoNTROL STRUC
TURE IN A FINANCIAL STATEMENT AUDIT ~ 11, at 6 (1988). This statement generally
establishes the requirements of an internal control structure comprising the control envi
ronment, the accounting system, and control procedures, for the purpose of giving reason
able assurance that transactions are authorized, transactions are recorded accurately,
access to assets is permitted only as authorized, and records of assets are compared with
existing assets.

129.
130.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 7.

131.
132. F. GALLEGOS, D. RICHARDSON & A. BORTHICK, supra note 126, at 496-97; I.
MARTIN, SECURITY, ACCURACY, AND PRIVACY IN CoMPUTER SYSTEMS 186-87 (1973).
133. See R. ELLIOTT & I. WILLINGHAM, MANAGEMENT FRAUD: DETECTION AND
DETERRENCE (1980).
134. A. HUTT & S. BOSWORTH, COMPUTER SECURITY HANDBOOK 33-45 (2d ed.
1988).
135. Id. at 41.
136. See Savage, supra note 25, at 2 (failure to deny fonner employee all computer
access led to the deletion of payroll information).
137. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2109 (1988). The Worker Adjustment and Retraining Noti
fication Act provides for employer notification for plant closings and mass layoffs.
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systems. When a system crashes, computer operators attempt to re
store processing quickly to minimize user inconvenience. If security
features impede restoring the system quickly, computer operators may
disable access control and forget to restore it when the crisis passes.
Managers should have procedures for reviewing system activity associ
ated with restarting failed systems to verify that security is disabled
only when absolutely necessary and is quickly restored. 138
C.

Maintaining Systems
1.

Changing Computing Environments

Managers must take reasonable care to modify security provisions
in accordance with changing security needs. The computing environ
ment continually evolves: systems grow in size and in the number of
access points; new versions of hardware and software are regularly
provided to users; there are increases in the number of users, in the
computing competence of individuals and society generally, and in the
complexity of systems. Security features appropriate in one environ
ment may be ineffective in another. One event that should always sig
nal the need to reevaluate security features is the implementation of
new software or new versions of existing software. A manager is
tempted to implement new software in the same manner as the old
software. The risk is that this default approach may lead to unantici
pated vulnerabilities. 139
2.

System Flaws

Even if vendors follow the best hardware and software develop
ment practices, they cannot guarantee error-free systems. It is a man
ager's responsibility to decide, primarily through testing, whether
systems and subsystems are sufficiently error-free so that if they were
installed, their use would not lead to unpredictable or destructive be
havior. As far as possible; managers should test new products in isola
tion so that if the products are corrupted,14O the damage can be
confined to the test system. To minimize the likelihood of acquiring
138. R. WEBER, supra note 118, at 186. Systems are vulnerable just after failures
when the need to get jobs running overrides the need to maintain established control
procedures.
139. F. GALLEGOS, D. RICHARDSON & A. BORTHICK, supra note 126, at 352-53.
For example, the vendor may change default values for security-related features or"change
the features themselves. Vendors typically help systems managers understand revisions by
including lists of feature changes in documentation for revised software.
140. See Tuck, The Aftermath afthe Virus, I THE EDP AUDITOR J. 9, 10 (1989), for
an account of the purchase of corrupted software from a commercial vendor.
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maliciously corrupted software, managers should buy software only
from authorized sources. 141
Software inevitably has flaws because no known developmental
technique guarantees error-free software. 142 The more complex the
software, the more likely it is to contain errors. Verifying the absence
of intentional errors is even more difficult. 143 Consequently, vendors
are continually patching software when fatal or costly errors come to
their attention. System managers should report these problems
promptly to vendors. When vendors distribute software patches for
correcting software errors, system managers should implement them
only after thorough testing. Clifford Stoll attributes the reluctance to
publicize patches for security functions "to the paranoia surrounding
these discoveries . . . and [to] the lack of channels to spread the
news."I44 Vendors have a responsibility to document security-related
patches and to take positive steps to distribute them to customers,
whether they are purchasers or lessees.
CONCLUSION

There is considerable tension among computer users between the
need for free access to computers and concerns for security. The aca
demic community in particular has warned against overreaction to re
cent incidents of computer abuse and has stressed the need for
continued openness and accessibility of computer networks. 145 A bal
ance between these two concerns is clearly needed even though the
potential for serious harm, where software is infected or sensitive in
formation is exposed, tips the balance in favor of security.
Systems managers cannot be expected to be insurers of security,
nor can they be responsible for all problems and wrongful acts by third
141. Denning, supra note 21, at 238.
142. See Fetzer, Program Verification: The Very Idea, 31 COMM. OF THE ACM,
1048, 1049-63 (1988), for a discussion of the difficulties inherent in verifying the correctness
of computer programs. Fetzer states that program performance cannot be guaranteed be
cause it is a function of the interaction of ill-defined components, i.e., software, firmware,
and hardware, and is thus probabilistic rather than deterministic. Repeated tests give only
inductive evidence of reliability, which is insufficient to prove program correctness. Id. at
1061.
143. Thompson, Reflections on Trusting Trust, 27 COMM. OF THE ACM 761, 762-63
(1984). Thompson explains how to change a compiler to make it deliberately miscompile
source code whenever it encountered a particular pattern. With this technique, intentional
unauthorized features could be introduced into programs. This example demonstrates
Thompson's point that no amount of source-level verification will identify all errors, with
the result that well-installed bugs will be almost impossible to detect.
144. Stoll, supra note 13, at 493.
145. King, supra note 109.
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parties. Managers will, however, be expected to use reasonable means
to secure computer systems and protect information - especially
when there is significant potential for harm to innocent third parties.
What constitutes reasonable care will vary with the circumstances of
each case and will change over time. Systems managers must be aware
of the potential liability and should document all security-related fea
tures and their effectiveness.

